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The Illusory Death Penalty:
Why America's Death Penalty Process
Fails to Support the Economic
Theories of Criminal Sanctions and
Deterrence
by
ALLAN D. JOHNSON*

Introduction
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court dealt a blow to
America's criminal justice system by deciding in Furman v. Georgia'
that the death penalty, as applied in three Georgia capital cases, was
cruel and unusual punishment and violative of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 2 The death sentences of all 633 inmates in
the nation's death rows suddenly became invalid and state lawmakers
scurried to write new death penalty laws that would pass
constitutional muster.3 Only four years later, Georgia was again

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2001; B.A., Azusa
Pacific University, 1996. Special thanks to Mark Seifert, Michael Houske, Mike Lum, Iver
Larson, and Jesse Mainardi for their invaluable comments and suggestions on earlier
drafts of this Note. This Note is intended to be a critique on the death penalty in America
from a "Law and Economics" point of view. The statements made in this Note, therefore,
do not necessarily represent my personal opinions about the death penalty in general.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. Ia at 239-40.

3. James R. Acker et al., Introduction to AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE
PENAL SANCTION 5, 6 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
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before the Supreme Court, arguing in Gregg v. Georgia4 that its new
death penalty statute was constitutional. 5 This time, Georgia
succeeded in convincing the Court that its death penalty procedure

was constitutional because it met the stricter

constitutional

6
parameters of capital punishment as defined in Furman.
Death penalty proponents, and most of America, breathed a
great sigh of relief as the four-year moratorium on imposition of the
death penalty was lifted. 7 Soon after Gregg, thirty-seven states8
passed new statutes mirroring Georgia's new scheme of bifurcating
the guilt and sentencing phases of trial and requiring judges and juries
to consider "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors in determining the
appropriateness of capital punishment in each case.9 While the new
standards reduced the likelihood of arbitrary or erroneous death
sentences, 10 they introduced a new complex system of death penalty
the state and federal levels." This has created a
appeals at both
"stalemate"'12 where the number of death penalty convictions in the
nation far exceed the number of executions.' 3 Thus, America's death
penalty has been turned into merely an illusion,14 serving as little or
no deterrent to crime.
The economic approach to criminal law provides a useful tool to

analyze the theoretical justifications of capital punishment. From an
economic view, the death penalty is a logical extension of the criminal

4. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5. Id at 162-63.
6. Id. at206-07.
7. The vast majority of Americans support the death penalty. See infra note 203.
8. See Deborah W. Denno, Execution and the Forgotten Eighth Amendment, in
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 547, 552 (James R. Acker
et al. eds., 1998).
9. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
10. Cf id. ("No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence;
it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.").
11. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 12 (1995).
12. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 957 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
the Court's denial of certiorari); see also text accompanying infra note 178.
13. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 4. Before Furman, executions occurred
much more frequently, and the average length of stay on death row was much shorter. For
example, from 1900 to 1960, New York State executed an average of more than one
person per month, and the average death row inmate was executed within eight months
after conviction. Lawbreakers: Death Row Diaries (THE HISTORY CHANNEL television
broadcast, Dec. 9,2000).
14. I respectfully borrow this term from a dissent written in 1980 by then-Justice
Rehnquist. See text accompanying infra note 178.
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justice system's primary goal of deterrence. 15 Nevertheless, the way
in which the death penalty process is actually carried out in this
country defeats the underlying economic justifications for having the
death penalty as an available sanction for heinous crimes. Thus, from
an economic standpoint, reform is needed to close the gap between
the theoretical and actual deterrent effects of the death penalty in
America.
Part I of this Note discusses the economic approach to criminal
law and its logical emphasis on the deterrence value of criminal
sanctions. Part II applies this economic reasoning to capital
punishment and illustrates that the death penalty may serve a useful
purpose for the economic theory of criminal law. Part III discusses
the current empirical research on the death penalty as a deterrent in
America and shows that the current death penalty appeals process
defeats any theoretical deterrent effect of capital punishment.
Finally, Part IV suggests a few ways in which America could reform
its death penalty appeals process to allow capital punishment to serve
as a greater deterrent, including the possibility that the most efficient
solution may be to abolish the death penalty.
I. The Economic Approach to Criminal Law
The central tenet of the economic approach to criminal law is
deterrence. 16 Capitalist societies use criminal sanctions to deter
people from "bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated
exchange."'17 This "system" is what economists generally refer to as
the "market."' 8 Since transaction costs are low in coerced exchanges
(e.g., robbery), criminals would always choose to bypass the market if
it were not for the risk of monetary or nonmonetary sanctions. 9 The
market is a more efficient method of allocating resources than forced
15. To be sure, there are many other possible justifications for the death penalty than
merely deterrence (e.g., retribution). Nevertheless, since this Note seeks a justification for
the death penalty from a "law and economics" viewpoint, I limit my discussion to capital
punishment's value as a deterrent. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a
Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 291 (1983) ("[Djeterrence may appear at odds
with other approaches to criminal law that rest on goals in addition to or other than
deterrence. I do not disregard these goals; I simply put them to one side because my
purpose in this paper is to establish that many existing features of criminal procedure are
understandable, and desirable, if deterrence is the goal of criminal law.").
16. Ia-at 292.
17. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1195 (1985).
18. Ic
19. Id
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exchanges, so market bypassing is inefficient in a wealthmaximization sense no matter how much utility the wrongdoer may
receive as fruits of his crime. 20 It is in this manner that crime can be
the maintenance of law and
seen as essentially an externality, "and
' 21
order... essentially a public good."
Like all economic analysis, this approach to criminal law assumes
that offenders will behave in accordance with the rules of optimizing
behavior. 22 This theory posits that an individual will rationally want
to maximize his gains23 and will want to minimize his losses or risk of
painful experiences (such as imprisonment). 24 The basic model of
criminal behavior, then, is that a person commits a crime because he
expects the benefits of the crime to exceed its costs325 The potential
benefits include both tangible and intangible gains from the crime.
Tangible benefits are the expected illegitimate payoffs from the crime
(e.g., stolen money) while intangible benefits may include factors such
as the personal satisfactions realized through harming a particular
person (e.g., "crimes of passion"). 26 The costs of a criminal's act
include out-of-pocket expenses (e.g., burglary tools, costs of selfprotection to escape punishment), the opportunity cost of the
criminal's time (including the forgone wages that could be gained
through a legitimate occupation), and the expected costs (including
risk) of criminal punishment. 27 It is this last cost that the criminal law
attempts to increase through sanctions.
20. I. Under the Kaldor Hicks "wealth maximization" standard of efficiency, "a
change in the state of the world is efficient if the losers are compensated by the winners."
UGO MATrEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 4 n.8 (1998). The "winner" in a
coercive transaction is the wrongdoer. The "losers" are the victim and society at large
(since the market serves society at large). Since a coercive transaction is inefficient,
criminal law shifts the burden of the transaction costs to the person best able to bear
them-in this case, the criminal. See id. at 4. Notice, though, that the economic approach
to criminal law is unique in that the utility gained by the criminal through his wrongful act
is completely ignored. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 251 (5th ed.
1998). This is because the social desirability of crime is almost zero. Id. "We 'charge'
more to people who value crime more because our object is to minimize crime." Id.In
other areas of law, the economic approach would analyze both parties' relative utility to
determine efficiency. See id.
21. Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON.
PBRSP.,

Winter 1996, at 43, 49.

22. Id. at 44.
23. Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 291.
24. Ernest van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, in PUNISHMENT AND
THE DEATH PENALTY:

THE CURRENT DEBATE 125, 128 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.

Rosenbaum eds., 1995).
25. POSNER, supra note 20, at 242.
26. Id.; Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 46.
27. POSNER, supra note 20, at 242; Ehrlich, supranote 21, at 46.
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Hence, criminal law is primarily focused on setting "prices" to
increase the criminal's overall expected costs of his wrongful
activity38 A potential criminal will only commit a wrongful act if he
perceives the expected criminal sanction as less severe than his
expected private benefits from the act.29 Therefore, if the price (i.e.,
sanction) is set at the optimal level of severity, the rational criminal
will decide that committing the crime is not worth the expected
sanction. In this situation, the '30criminal will not commit the act and
"he will be said to be deterred.
The optimal sanction for a crime must be high enough so that the
offender is worse off by committing the act.31 Thus, the sanction must
not only consider the cost of the criminal's act itself, but it must also
include some extra amount designed as a punitive damage to deter
the person from bypassing the market. 32 Hence, the correct sanction
for a "pure coercive transfer such as theft is something greater than
the law's estimate of the victim's loss. ' 33 Simply applying the level of
sanction to equal the amount of loss would be inadequate as a
deterrent since the criminal would always commit the lowtransaction-cost crime, even if he had to pay the market value after
every criminal act. 4

28. Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 292. The word "price" as used in criminal law is a
misnomer because it implies that society is willing to permit criminal behavior as long as
the criminal is made to compensate society for its loss. Robert Cooter, Prices and
Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524-25 (1984). Society, however, wants to eradicate
crime, not ration it. POSNER, supra note 20, at 251. Professor Cooter argues that the term
"price" should only be used to refer to the payment of money that is required in order to
do what is permitted, such as paying the seller's price in order to buy goods in the
marketplace. Cooter, supra,at 1525. In contrast, the word "sanction" means "a detriment
for doing what is forbidden." Id. at 1524. Criminal law is concerned with imposing a
detriment to induce conformity with the law, not to permit criminal behavior through a
pricing system. Therefore, the word "sanction" is more appropriate than "price" when
discussing criminal law.
29. Steven Shavell, CriminalLaw and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a
Deterrent,85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232,1235 (1985).
30. Id.
31. POSNER, supra note 20, at 243; see also Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 292. For the
seminal article on optimal sanction levels upon which most modern-day sanction-setting
theory is based, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
32. POSNER, supra note 20, at 240.
33. Id.
34. This assumes that the criminal would have to pay for the loss in every instance.
But, as will be discussed, the optimal sanction must also compensate for the reality that
the probability of apprehension and conviction for any given criminal act is always less
than one. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
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While this analysis makes theoretical sense in creating a
deterrent to crime, it does not explain why a criminal justice system is
needed in the first place.3 5 Indeed, many core criminal prohibitions
mirror intentional transgressions in tort. For example, murder,
larceny, and assault in criminal law mirror wrongful death,
conversion, and assault in tort law.36 It seems as though this
deterrence could be accomplished more efficiently through a series of
escalating civil (and thus private) punitive damages to compensate
victims of crimes. 37 Criminal law enforcement, after all, involves a
great amount of public resources, including a police force,
government prosecutors and defense attorneys, and separate criminal
court proceedings. When considering these large enforcement costs,
a private system of enforcement through existing tort law would seem
more efficient. Nevertheless, this theory ignores some inherent
limitations of using tort law as a private criminal law enforcement
mechanism.
First, as the optimal level of sanction rises, the ability of a
8
criminal to pay the private damage award becomes less feasible
Obviously, if the criminal expects the level of monetary sanction to
exceed his ability to pay, the sanction will have no deterrent effect.
Likewise, crimes that cause death or pose a substantial risk of death
involve "astronomical" optimal damages 39 and virtually no criminal
would be able to pay the sanction. 40 This means that a monetary
sanction will have little or no deterrent effect in either of two
situations: (1) the criminal has no assets; or (2) the level of expected
harm (damages) incurred by the victim is very high.41 Therefore, in
these two situations, a private tort system of crime enforcement
would be inefficient in adequately inducing would-be criminals to
remain within the market system; only threats of nonmonetary
sanctions, such as imprisonment, would be likely to deter these
criminals.
Second, as the probability of harm increases, the optimal level of
damages increases at an even greater rate. 42 This is because the
35. See Posner, supra note 17, at 1194-95.
36. POSNER, supra note 20, at 237.
37. Id. at 240-41.
38. Id39. Id.
40. This is especially true considering that most criminals are poor and the motivation
for many crimes is to wrongfully obtain money.
41. Cf Shavell, supra note 29, at 1236-38 (discussing five factors to consider when
determining whether a nonmonetary damage should be imposed); see also infra note 53.
42. Shavell, supra note 29, at 1237.
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relationship between risk and compensation is nonlinear.43 For
example, if A would be willing to accept $1 as compensation for a
.0001 chance that he will be accidentally killed by B, it does not
necessarily mean that A will only demand $10,000 as compensation to
let B murder him.44 The risk of a person being accidentally
(negligently) killed is randomly distributed throughout the general
population, but the risk of being murdered is centered around a
relatively small number of people whom murderers want to kill.45
This means that in crimes like murder, the optimal level of damages
would far exceed the optimal level of damages for a negligent
wrongful death.46 And, as previously discussed, this high level of
optimal damages is unable to deter someone who cannot afford to
pay it.
Third, as the probability that a criminal will conceal his crime
and escape sanctioning rises, the optimal damages must also rise.47
Typical negligent, tortious accidents are not easily concealed. 48 This
is because the non-intentional tort is the unfortunate result of lawful
activity. But, when a wrongdoer's entire purpose is to commit an
intentional tort and cover it up, he will often succeed at concealing
the act.49 Crimes typically involve acts where the probability of the
wrongdoer escaping punishment is greater than torts. Here again, the
expected monetary sanction of a crime is likely to exceed the
criminal's ability to pay and hence will provide little deterrence.
A useful formula for illustrating the prohibitive optimal
monetary damages of a typical crime is D = L/p.50 D is the optimal
damages award; L is the harm incurred by the victim (which includes
the punitive adjustment to discourage the criminal from bypassing the
market through coercive transfers); and p is the probability of the
criminal being caught and being forced to pay the damages. 51 This
formula illustrates why the optimal sanctions for crimes generally
exceed tort damages and a criminal's ability to pay. For example, if
criminals are always apprehended and forced to pay damages, p = 1
and the tort damages for the injury would equal those of a equivalent

43. POSNER, supranote 20, at 240.

44. I at 241.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Shavell, supra note 29, at 1237; POSNER, supra note 20, at 241.
POSNER, supranote 20, at 241.
Id

Id
Id
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crime (L and D are the same). 52 If p < 1, however, as it always must
be (because the police can never catch every criminal), the optimal
damages level (D) rises. Thus, if only in 1 out of every 10 specific
criminal acts (keeping L constant) the wrongdoer is caught and
brought to justice, p = .1 and the optimal payment jumps to 10 times
the amount. Hence, the formula shows that once all factors are
considered, including: (1) the punitive damage to induce the
criminal's proper behavior (to use the market for transfers), (2) the
higher amount due to the nonlinear relationship between risk and
compensation, and (3) the lower probability of criminals being
crimes
apprehended and convicted, the optimal damages in typical
53
can become higher than the wrongdoer can afford to pay.
Since the optimal sanction is usually higher in typical crimes than
the tort system could effectively enforce, society invests huge
amounts of public resources to deter crime through criminal
sanctions.54 From an economic efficiency viewpoint, these criminal
sanctions, whenever possible, should be enforced through fines rather

than imprisonment or other forms of nonmonetary sanctions. 55 This
is because fines impose disutility upon the criminal while providing 56a
corresponding benefit to society in the form of money.

52. Id.
53. I& Professor Shavell expresses this same concept by listing five factors to consider
when setting monetary sanctions: (1) The size of the wrongdoer's assets; (2) The
probability that the wrongdoer will escape apprehension and sanctions; (3) The degree to
which the wrongdoer will receive private benefits (tangible and intangible); (4) The
probability that the act will cause harm; and (5) The magnitude of the resulting harm.
Shavell, supra note 29, at 1236-37. Applying these factors to typical crimes, the size of the
optimal sanction is too high for the typical criminal to pay. Id. First, criminals are
generally poor and often seek money through crime. Id. at 1238. Second, criminal acts
frequently go unpunished. Id Third, the magnitude of a criminal's private benefits can
often exceed the highest monetary sanction (as in crimes of passion). Id. at 1239. Finally,
the magnitude and probability of harm is often very high in typical crimes. Id.
54. This is not to say that the criminal justice system should always be utilized to
enforce laws. Since the criminal justice system imposes such a high cost on society (in the
form of police, prisons, etc.), the tort system should be used whenever it will provide an
effective deterrent. POSNER, supra note 20, at 241-42. This means that whenever the
optimal sanctions formula or the Shavell factors yield a number that the wrongdoer can
afford to pay, the tort remedy will probably provide an effective deterrent. Id- at 242; see
also Shavell, supra note 29, at 1235-36. This is why the criminal justice system is often said
to be designed for the poor; the tort system is an effective deterrent for the wealthy.
POSNER, supra note 20, at 242.
55. Shavell, supra note 29, at 1236; Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 293; POSNER, supra
note 20, at 246.
56. Easterbrook, supranote 15, at 293.
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Imprisonment, on the other hand, is inefficient 57 because it "imposes
deadweight losses-losses not received as gains by anyone else in the
form of the criminal's forgone legitimate earnings and the costs of
guarding him. '58 Nevertheless, since society has a strong interest in
deterring crime, imprisonment is necessary whenever the probability
of conviction (p) falls significantly or when the magnitude of the harm
rises significantly (L).59 Indeed, as the harmfulness of the crime
increases, society places a greater value on deterrence. 60 This means
that society should be more willing to bear the costs of nonmonetary
sanctions (in the form of police and prisons) when deterrence
requires a high sanction on insolvent criminals. 61 Thus, while fines
are preferable from an economic standpoint, 62 without nonmonetary
sanctions most criminals would go unpunished and the system would
fail in its broader goal to create deterrence.
Since effective law enforcement involves great amounts of public
resources, the economic approach to criminal law attempts to strike a
balance between the severity level of the optimal sanction (D) and
the probability of conviction (p). 63 For example, to sustain the
probability of apprehension and conviction of criminals (p) at a high
level, more expenses are required to maintain a vigilant enforcement
system.64 But, the same level of theoretical deterrence can be
achieved by convicting fewer people (reducing p), but treating each of
those convicted more severely (increasing D). 65 This approach
represents a trade-off between conserving scarce police and

57. Nonmonetary sanctions are inefficient because "the disutility experienced by
parties punished by nonmonetary sanctions is not balanced in any automatic way by
additions to the utility of other parties [such as society]." Shavell, supra note 29, at 1235.
58. Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for GovernmentalMisconduct in Criminal
Cases, 57 WASH. L. REv. 635, 636 (1982). Current statistics of the nation's penal system
show the gravity of this "deadweight loss"-approximately 1.5 million convicted criminals
are currently incarcerated in U.S. prisons. Investigative Reports: Nevada's Parole Board
(A&E television broadcast, Dec. 6, 2000). Of course, imprisonment does provide one
large benefit that a fine cannot: The criminal is unable to commit more crimes while he is
in prison. POSNER, supra note 20, at 246-47. Indeed, statistics show that more than 50%
of convicted criminals released on parole will commit another crime during the parole
period. InvestigativeReports: Nevada'sParole Board,supra.
59. Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 293-94.
60. Shavell, supra note 29,at 1244.
61. Id.
62. Posner, supra note 58, at 636.
63. Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 293.
64. Shavell, supra note 29, at 1235-36.
65. Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 293.
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prosecution resources and maintaining deterrence at an effective
level.

66

There are limits, however, to how severe the sanction and how
low the probability of apprehension and conviction can become, while
still providing an effective deterrent. First, as the probability of
apprehension and conviction (p) goes down, the criminal justice
system begins to increasingly resemble a lottery.67 As the chance of
apprehension and conviction goes down, wrongdoers who are actually
caught and convicted are not only offenders, but are also incredibly
unlucky. This subjects convicted offenders to greater ex post
discrimination under the law because each convicted criminal "pays"
not only for his own crime but also for the crimes of all those who got
away. 68 Greater ex post discrimination seems unfair from a justice
standpoint, 69 but it also works against the goal of deterrence.
This "luck" factor of conviction works against deterrence in the
form of "discounting," which imposes an upper limit on the
effectiveness of increasingly severe sanctions.7 ° Discounting means
that threatening a sentence of twenty years in jail is not twice as
onerous as threatening ten years in jail. 71 This problem exists because
criminals, like all people, discount the future. For example, paying
$100 in income taxes now is always more "expensive" than paying
$100 in taxes a year from now. This well-known "time value of
money" theory reflects the consideration of opportunity costs similar
to those measured in discounting. Similar to the taxes example, the
threat of spending next year in jail is more serious than the threat of
spending one year in jail ten years from now.72 Discounting reduces
the deterrence level of increasingly severe sanctions because, for most
66. Id. at292.
67. Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 64.
68. Id.
69. The economic analysis of criminal law is not primarily concerned with issues of
"justice." Cf. MATrEI, supra note 20, at 3 ("[Economic interpretation of the law] should
not be guided by justice. It should be guided by efficiency."). Nevertheless, arbitrariness
and discrimination in criminal sanctions may invoke "justice" issues and deterrence
concerns. Indeed, many jurisdictions have implemented measures, such as criminal
sentencing reforms, to decrease ex post discrimination. For example, in 1984 Congress
passed the Sentencing Reform Act to reduce ex post discrimination that may result from
broad judicial discretion in sentencing. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1993) (stating that the
purposes of the Act include providing "certainty and fairness [by] avoiding unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar criminal conduct").
70. See Cooter, supra note 28, at 1550 n.60.
71. Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 295.
72. Id. at294.
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criminals, the opportunities of the present seem more important than
those of the future 73 This is especially true considering that many
criminals may believe that the state will let them out of prison early
on parole.74
Thus, discounting forces society to set the probability of
apprehension and conviction (p) and severity of sanction (D) at an
efficient level. For example, if "criminals discount their future
substantially, say at a 20% rate, then we obtain the same deterrence
by incarcerating one person for life or five people for one year
each." 75 Severity of punishment, therefore, is often traded at6 the
margins for a higher probability of apprehension and conviction2
A second limit on the increasing severity of sanctions is
overdeterrence.7 7 The threat of a very severe fine or prison term may
cause people to avoid socially beneficial activities out of fear of
accidentally breaking the law or being falsely accused and convicted. 78
Thus, imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a
speeding violation would overdeter (and be inefficient) in that people
would drive too slowly or avoid the socially beneficial act of driving
altogether. 79 Sanctions, therefore, must be set at a severity level that
considers both the problem of discounting and the social opportunity
costs of potential overdeterrence.

73. Id
74. Cf id.
75. Id at 295.
76. Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 64. Results of empirical studies have suggested that the
theory of discounting is sound. Many studies show that an increase in the probability of
apprehension and conviction is more effective as a deterrent than an increase in the
severity level of the sanction. Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 295 & n.7 (citing several
empirical studies supporting the proposition); see also Brian E. Forst, The DeterrentEffect
of CapitalPunishment. A Cross-StateAnalysis of the 1960s, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A
READER 59, 66 (Glen H. Stassen ed., 1998) (finding support through empirical study for
the theory that certainty of punishment is a more effective deterrent than severity of
punishment).
77. Posner, supra note 58, at 637.
78. Id.
79. Id. There is a possibility that an unreasonable sanction (such as life imprisonment
for speeding) would create a problem of underdeterrence. This is because a typical person
will conform his behavior to "a reasonable obligation backed by a reasonable sanction."
Cooter, supra note 28, at 1549 (emphasis added). If the sanction is unreasonable, it could
potentially cause no one to take the law seriously and thus provide no deterrence to the
unwanted act.
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H. The Economic Approach as Applied to Capital Punishment
As was shown, criminal law "has an impressive economic
logic."80 The justification for capital punishment from an economic
standpoint is a simple, logical extension of the theory of optimal
deterrence. First, by applying the basic optimal sanctions formula,
D = L/p, it follows that as the degree of harm (L) approaches an
infinitely high level and the probability of apprehension and
conviction (p) approaches an infinitely low level, the required
sanction (D) will have to be incredibly severe in order to provide an
effective deterrent. An example of this would be a particularly
heinous, premeditated, multiple-victim murder. In this case, the
degree of harm (L) is very high because the death of several people is
involved. In addition, a premeditated murder involves a great
amount of planning on the part of the murderer; the more a criminal
plans in advance of the crime, the more likely the crime will go
unpunished (decreasing p). Therefore, the highest non-lethal, nonmonetary sanction (such as life imprisonment without parole) may
not impose a high enough cost on the criminal (in comparison to the
level of harm and probability of conviction) to serve as an adequate
deterrent.8 ' Thus, a more severe sanction may be required for these
uniquely heinous crimes. Since criminals "fear death more than life
imprisonment" and "[w]hat is feared most deters most,"' 2 it follows
that the sanction of death may be the only effective deterrent for
some crimes.
The second justification for the death penalty from an economic
standpoint involves the problem of discounting. Without considering
discounting, life imprisonment would seem to always provide a
deterrent because the threat of going to prison for the rest of one's
life would seem to always impose higher costs on a potential
murderer than any private utility he could gain from killing the
victim. 83 Nevertheless, since a potential murderer will discount the

future years of imprisonment, even life imprisonment without parole
may not be an adequate deterrent for a few very shocking crimes.
Lastly, capital punishment serves another goal of criminal law:
marginal deterrence. This concept rests on the principle that if a
crime is going to occur, society has an interest in providing an
80. Posner, supra note 17, at 1230.
81. POSNER, supra note 20, at 248.
82. Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty May Save Innocent Lives, in DOES
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DETER CRIME? 53,54 (Stephen S. Schonebaum ed., 1998).
83. POSNER, supra note 20, at 248.
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incentive to criminals to substitute more serious crimes with less
serious crimes. 84 For example, robbery is punished less severely than
murder. This is because society views the harm of taking money by
force to be less than the harm produced by killing another human
being. If all robbers were punished as severely as all murderers,
robbers would have no disincentive from killing their victims to
eliminate all witnesses to the crime.85 Thus, less serious crimes are
punished less severely to encourage a criminal to commit the least
serious crime possible (and inflict the least amount of relative societal
harm).
Applying the theory of marginal deterrence to very serious
crimes like murder shows that capital punishment may be necessary
to induce certain criminals to commit lesser crimes. For example, if a
murderer is going to kill someone, society would prefer that the
murderer kill only one victim rather than two or three. Thus, if life
imprisonment without parole is the punishment required to deter a
single murder, something greater is needed to discourage the
murderer from killing one victim and also all the witnesses in the
room. 86 Also, criminals who are already serving a life sentence have
no disincentive from murdering other inmates while in prison unless
there is a greater threat available. 87 In these situations, the only
punishment greater than life imprisonment without parole is the
death penalty.
Indeed, this explains from a deterrence viewpoint why the death
penalty is not imposed on all murderers. Historically, however, the
death penalty was imposed for several felonies besides murder. For
example, in colonial America, rape, kidnapping, witchcraft, adultery,
sodomy, treason, grand larceny, and arson were all punishable by
death.88 Reasons for this are that people in that time were more
religious, life spans were shorter, and virtually everyone believed in
the better afterlife. 89 Death, therefore, was not viewed as the severe
punishment it is seen as today.90

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 245.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id.
Information Plus, A General History of Capital Punishment in America, in
PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE CURRENT DEBATE 103, 103 (Robert M.
Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1995).
89. POSNER, supra note 20, at 249.
90. Id.
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Nevertheless, colonial America, and other societies that had
similar criminal codes, still had to solve the problem of marginal
deterrence. Since all serious crimes were punished with equal
severity (after all, death is death), there were no incentives for
criminals to trade more harmful crimes for relatively less harmful
ones. The solution devised was to impose increasingly severe forms
of capital punishment on increasingly harmful crimes. 91 Thus, since
policing and forensic science were not as sophisticated or effective as
they are today, the most horrible ways to die were reserved for either
the most harmful crimes or crimes with the lowest probability of
apprehension and conviction.92 For example, murdering someone by
poison yielded a severe method of execution because poisoners were
the most difficult type of murderer to catch. 93 Therefore, poisoners
were executed by boiling them in oil, which society considered as one
of the more horrible ways to die. 94
In contrast, modem statutes do not impose the death penalty
even on most murderers. "Aggravating circumstances" are required
in addition to murder to qualify for the death penalty. Typical
aggravating factors in death penalty statutes include: (1) murdering a
victim while committing another serious felony such as armed
robbery, rape, or kidnapping; (2) murdering a police officer or judge;
(3) murdering a victim in a particularly heinous manner, such as
through torture; (4) the murder was committed by someone in, or
who has escaped from, prison; and (5) murdering a potential witness
in a court proceeding. 95 Thus, modern death penalty statutes reflect
society's interest in marginal deterrence by only imposing the

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id

94. Id Executions in colonial America were also performed in public to further
increase deterrence. Information Plus, supra note 88, at 109-10. Nevertheless, the "circus
atmosphere" surrounding public executions led most states by the 1930s to conduct
executions only in private to satisfy the outcry of those wanting to abolish capital
punishment. Id.
95. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 165 n.9 (1976) (listing the ten aggravating
circumstances in Georgia's death penalty statute); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1999)
(authorizing death penalty for murders committed with "special circumstances," including:
murders committed by bombs; murders committed to avoid arrest; the murder victim was
a witness to a crime and was intentionally killed to prevent the witness from testifying; the
murder victim was a police officer, firefighter, judge, or prosecutor; murders committed in
a particularly heinous fashion; murders committed while engaging in a serious felony or
through "drive-by shootings"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4500 (West 1999) (authorizing death
penalty for murders committed by anyone currently serving a life sentence).
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ultimate sanction on those whom society considers to be the worst
96
offenders (i.e., those who need the highest threat to be deterred).
While the economic approach to criminal law provides a logical
justification for the death penalty, many criminologists have
challenged the applicability of deterrence theory to murder. These
scholars contend that most murders are not premeditated, but are
rather "emotionally charged" and "spontaneous" events-"acts of
passion." 97 Under such emotional conditions, they argue, it is
unlikely that potential murderers will be the rational optimizers that
the deterrence theory presumes them to be. 98 Thus, capital
punishment could not provide a deterrent to most murders. There
are, however, a couple of responses to this argument. First, while
some criminal behavior is "random," enough of it is calculated that
changes in criminal penalties affect the level of crime. 99 Indeed,

empirical literature supports the theory that criminals respond to
changes in opportunity costs, in the probability of apprehension, and
in the severity of punishment, "as if they were rational calculators of
°
the economic model."'1
Second, the deterrence theory already takes spontaneous acts
into account in setting the optimal sanction. Spontaneous acts
committed in the heat of passion are unlikely to be premeditated.
This generally means that concealment will be more difficult for the
murderer and the probability of apprehension and conviction goes
up. 0 1 Thus, the optimal sanction will be less severe for these lessplanned and easier-to-detect crimes. °2 In contrast, a criminal who
96. Of course, the death penalty is subject to constitutional limitations, including the
Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause. In addition to furthering
the goals of marginal deterrence, aggravating factors ensure that the death penalty is not
an unconstitutional punishment for a given crime. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 797, 801 (1982) (stating that it would be unconstitutional to make robbery punishable
by the death penalty and holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional if imposed on
certain types of felony murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that
the death penalty "is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of
rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual
punishment").
97. Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Is Capital Punishment an Effective
Deterrent for Murder? An Examination of Social Science Research, in AMERICA'S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND

FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 157,158 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
9& Id.
99. Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 291.
100. POSNER, supra note 20, at 243 (citing empirical studies that support the
proposition).
101. Id at 257.

102. Id
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has planned in advance is likely to be more thoughtful about weighing
the costs and benefits of the illegal act, including the expected
punishment. These "thoughtful" criminals are more deterrable,
therefore, because they are performing at least some of the rational
optimizing thought process. 0 3 Society punishes impulsive, less
"thoughtful" criminals less harshly because they are less deterrable
(and a harsh punishment on these criminals would be less
efficacious). 104 Therefore, the death penalty will not be imposed on
less deterrable criminals because such a harsh sentence is unlikely to
be a deterrent anyway. Indeed, this policy is reflected in modem
death penalty statutes in that impulsive, "heat of passion" murders
are not punished by the death penalty; the death penalty is only
imposed upon the murderers who are most deterrable-those who
premeditate and choose to commit the crime in a more heinous
manner.105
In summary, the logical application of the economic analysis of
criminal law supports the death penalty as a justifiable (and possibly
necessary) sanction for certain high-harmfulness, low-probability-ofconviction crimes. Given the severity and finality of the death
penalty as the highest conceivable threat, it follows that empirical
research should demonstrate that capital punishment provides a great
amount of deterrence to murder. Nevertheless, the vast majority of
empirical studies shows that the death penalty is at best a mild
deterrent, and at worst no deterrent at all.
HI.

The Current State of Capital Punishment in America

A. Empirical Studies of Capital Punishment in America
Since the early twentieth century, social scientists have been
10 6
examining the general deterrent effect of capital punishment.
Many of the early studies compared mean homicide rates for deathpenalty states with the rates for non-death-penalty (abolitionist)
states. 0 7 Other studies compared homicide rates for death-penalty
states with rates for neighboring abolitionist states.0 8 Still others
compared homicide rates for an individual state before and after the
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
Stephen E. Schonebaum, Introduction to DOES CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DETER
CRIME? 6,7 (Stephen E. Schonebaum ed., 1998).
107. Peterson & Bailey, supra note 97, at 159.
108. Id.
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death penalty was either enacted or abolished. 0 9 None of these early
studies could show that the death penalty had any significant
deterrent effect on murder rates." 0 Nevertheless, these studies were
of limited value because they failed to consider many other factors
besides capital punishment that may affect the homicide rate in a
given jurisdiction. For example, statistics show that homicide rates
are higher in jurisdictions with large urban, black, youthful, and poor
populations."' If these "socio-demographic conditions" are more
common in death-penalty jurisdictions, then these factors may mask
2
the actual deterrent effect of the death penalty."
Later, in the mid-1970s, Isaac Ehrlich, a statistician, looked at the
national homicide rates between 1930 and 1970."1 Ehrlich's study
was revolutionary in that it introduced "multivariate regression
analysis" to empirical studies of the deterrent effect of capital
punishment." 4 By using this technique, Ehrlich was able to isolate
the effects of the death penalty on deterrence from the effects of
several other socio-demographic factors." 5 In stark contrast to earlier
studies, Ehrlich announced that his study proved that between 1933
and 1969, each execution deterred seven or eight murders in the
6
United States."
While Ehrlich showed a significant deterrent effect of capital
punishment on murder rates, scholars have heavily criticized his
research." 7 Some have criticized Ehrlich for ignoring some key
variables in his study, such as the increased availability of guns and
the decline in time served in prison for homicide." 8 Others have
pointed out that Ehrlich's results are skewed because he looked at
murder rates for the nation as a whole without considering deathpenalty and abolitionist states separately." 9 The most compelling

109. Id
110. Schonebaum, supra note 106, at 7.
111. Peterson & Bailey, supra note 97, at 160.
112. Id.
113. Schonebaum, supra note 106, at 7.
114. Peterson & Bailey, supra note 97, at 166.
115. Id.
116. Id.at 165.
117. Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The
Views ofthe Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (1996).
118. Schonebaum, supra note 106, at 7.
119. Peterson & Bailey, supra note 97, at 165. This problem is illustrated by the fact
that during 1933-1969, the murder rate for death-penalty states was higher than the rate
for abolitionist states. Id. Ehrlich's study, however, compared the national murder rate to
the national execution rate. Since abolitionist states will always have an execution rate of
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criticism of Ehrlich's study, however, is the fact that no scholar has
120
been able to replicate his results.
Most modem empirical studies using Ehrlich's multivariate
regression analysis have found that the death penalty has virtually the
same effect on murder rates as long-term imprisonment. 121 On the
edges, however, studies have shown widely differing results. For
example, one 1985 statistical study showed that every execution
deters an average of eighteen murders. 22 On the other hand, other
studies have shown that the death penalty may increase the murder
rate. For example, one study that looked at homicide rates in New
York State between 1907 and 1963 found that the murder rate
actually increased slightly following each execution.123 To explain this
phenomenon, scholars created the "brutilization theory," which posits
that state-sanctioned executions brutalize the "sensibilities of
society," making potential murderers less inhibited. 24
In an attempt to explain why empirical studies looking at the
same data can yield such varying results, Professor McManus looked
at the research methodology of existing deterrence studiesY'2 He
found that the conflicts among studies stem from the different
interpretation each researcher performs on the raw statistics. 126 Each
study is subject to great discretion by the individual researcher
because he may choose to include or ignore certain variables that will
affect the end result based on his own interpretation of the
significance of the variables. 27 By focusing on the discretionary
choices that researchers make in conducting their studies, Professor
McManus was able to show that the same raw statistics can prove

zero, a national study that ignores the different execution and murder rates in particular
states will have deceiving results. Id.
120. Id.
121. Radelet & Akers, supra note 117, at 3. For example, one recent study that
attempted to replicate Ehrlich's methods, while isolating additional factors that Ehrlich
ignored, showed that the death penalty has no significant deterrent effect on murder rates.
Forst, supranote 76, at 66.
122. van den Haag, supra note 82, at 53.
123. Schonebaum, supra note 106, at 8.
124. Id For a more recent study that illustrates the same phenomenon by focusing on
California's homicide rates, see Michael J.Godfrey & Vincent Schiraldi, The Death
Penalty May Increase Homicide Rates, in DOES CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DETER CRIME?
47, 50 (Stephen E. Schonebaum ed., 1998) (arguing that by using the death penalty, the
state may "lead by example" and increase homicide rates following executions).
125. Walter S. McManus, Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of CapitalPunishment: The
Importance of the Researcher'sPriorBeliefs, 93 J. POL. ECON. 417, 423 (1985).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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either that capital punishment is a significant deterrent or not.12
Professor McManus argues, therefore, that the most significant
variable in a deterrence study is the researcher's prior beliefs about
the death penalty since those beliefs will affect how the researcher
uses his discretionary choosing of variables and their relative
significance. 129
Thus, given the varying results of empirical studies on capital
punishment's deterrent effect, the research may result in a net gain of
zero-supporters and opponents of the death penalty "can select
either position and cite only those studies that support their
30
position.'
It is for this reason, despite the majority of scholars who believe
the death penalty does not provide a significant deterrent,' 31 that
many scholars argue that it is impossible to measure its true
deterrence through statistics. 132 Indeed, given the infinite number of
variables that may potentially affect the murder rate,133 empirical
research may never be able to provide a conclusive answer as to
whether the death penalty provides a significant deterrent to
murder.134

128. Id at 425.
129. Id
130. Radelet & Akers, supra note 117, at 4.
131. In a 1996 study that sent questionnaires to 70 "experts" in the field of criminology,
87.5% replied that, based on their review of the available empirical studies and literature,
the death penalty provides no deterrent effect. Id at 7. Looking at the available research
in criminology, 94% of respondents believed that the deterrent effect had weak or no
empirical support. Id at 9.
132. See, e.g., van den Haag, supra note 82, at 54; van den Haag, supra note 24, at 132
("[L]ack of evidence for deterrence is [not] evidence of nondeterrence.... It means that
deterrence has not been demonstrated statistically-not that nondeterrence has been
[proven).... It is entirely possible.., that the statistics used, though the best available, are
nonetheless too slender a reed to rest conclusions on.").
133. The complexity of choosing variables in a deterrence study is exemplified by
Professor Forst's cross-state analysis of capital punishment in the 1960s. See Forst, supra
note 76, at 60. This study posited that the homicide rate is potentially influenced by: (1)
the rate at which persons convicted of murder are executed; (2) the rate at which murders
result in conviction; (3) the average prison term served by convicted murderers; (4) social
and demographic characteristics (including age, race, sex, urbanization, school enrollment
rate, resident population, divorce rate); and (5) economic variables (including median
family income, proportion of families in poverty, employment). Id Indeed, it very well
may be impossible to include every possible variable-there are probably other variables
that have not yet been discovered that affect the murder rate. Cf.van den Haag, supra
note 82, at 54.
134. Cf.Schonebaum, supra note 106, at 7 ("In the end, social science has been unable
to either conclusively support or disprove the theory that capital punishment deters
crime.").
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Nevertheless, the fact that most research has shown that capital
punishment provides very little deterrence to murder undermines the
economic approach's rationale for the death penalty. After all, if the
central purpose of punishment is deterrence, as the economic
approach posits, then any punishment that does not provide an
effective (and efficient) deterrent should be eliminated. To bridge
this gap between the death penalty's theoretical deterrence (and
economic justification) and the death penalty's lack of deterrence in
actual practice, the cause of the reduced deterrent effect must be
determined. The most likely culprit is the delay between sentencing
and the actual execution that is caused by an excessively long appeals
process.
B. The Inefficient Death Penalty Appeals Process
The main objective of the criminal procedural system, viewed
from an economic standpoint, is to minimize the sum of two types of
costs: the cost of erroneous judicial decisions and the cost of
operating the procedural system.135 The criminal procedural system is
concerned about convicting an innocent person because an erroneous
criminal conviction reduces the expected punishment costs of
potential criminals. 136 After all, the greater the number of innocent
people that are convicted, the less the criminal's actual conduct
affects whether he will be found guilty and sanctioned-this decreases
the would-be criminal's expected punishment costs. 37 And, as the
expected punishment costs decrease, it becomes more likely that a
would-be criminal will believe that the expected benefits of the
38
wrongful act will exceed its costs, thereby reducing deterrence.
Inadvertently convicting innocent persons, then, can work to defeat
the criminal system's main goal of deterring crime. Thus, criminal
procedure builds in safeguards to reduce the probability of wrongful
convictions, such as the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard
and appellate courts to correct erroneous trial court decisions. The
justice system
very complex and costly procedures of the criminal
"reflect the high costs of erroneous convictions. 1 39
In a case where the death penalty may be imposed as a sanction,
the costs of an erroneous conviction increase drastically. After

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

POSNER, supra note 20, at 599.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 605 n.1.
Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 294.
Id. at 328.
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Furman,capital cases must be treated differently than other criminal
cases because the death penalty is "an usually severe punishment,
unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.'

140

Sentencing

an innocent person to death would not only inflict an unjust (and
unconstitutional) punishment, it would also greatly reduce the

deterrence value (if any) of the death penalty.' 4 '

Therefore,

heightened procedural safeguards exist in death penalty cases to

dramatically curtail the possibility of executing the wrong person. 42

While the American criminal justice system has created a
meticulous death penalty appeals process that is effective in reducing

the potential cost of erroneous convictions, 43 it has failed to provide
these assurances in an efficient manner. 44 This inefficiency is
illustrated by the fact that there are now over 3,000 inmates on
America's death rows.1 45

This exists because the rate at which

criminals are sentenced to death (about 250 nationally per year) far
exceeds the rate at which they are executed. 146

For example,

California has over 400 death row inmates 47 and sentences about
three criminals to death per month, but has only executed nine people

140. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Even modem-day executions (thought to be more humane than historical,
Draconian methods) can be incredibly painful and dreadful. See, e.g., Denno, supra note
8, app. at 572-76 (recounting the heinous details of "botched" executions since 1976).
141. Indeed, if the death penalty were randomly distributed between guilty and
innocent persons, then this severe punishment would yield no deterrence to serious
crimes. Cf POSNER, supra note 20, at 605 n.1. In this "random distribution" situation, the
expected cost of punishment to the potential criminal is unaffected by whether the
criminal commits the crime or not. Id; see also supra text accompanying notes 136-138.
142. See Denno, supra note 8, at 550 (explaining why heightened procedural
requirements are needed for the death penalty to remain constitutional); but cf.Posner,
supra note 58, at 645 (discussing that if a person is rightfully found guilty of a crime, then a
too-liberal appellate process will impose more deadweight losses on the criminal justice
system).
143. The error rate of the current system is rather low. It is estimated that about 87
people sentenced to death since 1976 have been later exonerated and freed. Benjamin
Soskis, Alive and Kicking, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL
4661954. Approximately 5,000 people have been sentenced to death since 1972. Kozinski
& Gallagher, supra note 11, at 25. This puts the error rate (87/5000) at slightly over 1%.
144. See Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of this Mess: Steps Toward Addressing and
Avoiding InordinateDelay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1998)
("Despite a firm commitment to capital prosecutions, the states have not established
effective and efficient capital case processing systems.").
145. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 19.
146. Id The national conviction-to-execution ratio in 1993 was eight to one. Id at 4
n.14.
147. Id at 13.
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since 1978.148 The gap between death penalty convictions and
executions is widening each year because the appeals process is very
complex and creates long delay.149
Most of the delay in a capital case occurs between the sentencing
and the execution. 150 While the defendant in a capital case may wait
up to two years to be convicted, sentenced, and sent to death row, the

convicted criminal will remain on death row for an average of ten
years. 51' This long wait on death row is mainly due to the large
number of mandatory death penalty appeals that a state supreme
court has to process each year, which causes a backlog of cases. 5 2 For
example, the California Supreme Court is able to process, at most,
only 75% of the mandatory death penalty appeals it receives each
year. 5 3 In the typical term, however, the court processes only 10% of
the total appeals pending. 154 And when the court does hear an
appeal, it rarely overturns a conviction or sentence in a capital case. 155
Once the death row inmate clears the lengthy state-level

appellate process, further delay is introduced by numerous habeas
corpus appeals to federal courts.156 Capital defendants can obtain
federal habeas corpus review of their convictions and sentences by
arguing that their imprisonment and pending execution violate the
U.S. Constitution.157

If the federal court concludes that the

defendant's constitutional due process rights were violated, it may
issue an order to the state court to conduct additional proceedings or

to release the defendant within a certain time limit. 158 Recent federal
148. Kurt Streeter, Convicted Killer Gets Wish, Is Executed at San Quentin, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2001, at Al (recounting the history of the death penalty in California); Executed
in California,WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at A10 (reporting California's most recent
execution of Robert Lee Massie who spent 21 years on death row appealing his
conviction). California's post-Furman death penalty statute took effect in 1978. Mack
Reed, An Even Longer Wait on Death Row, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3,1996, at Al.
149. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 25. It is estimated that to eliminate the
backlog of convicted murderers on death row, there would have to be one execution every
day for the next 26 years. Id. at 19.
150. Aarons, supra note 144, at 2.
151. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 6, 10. For a comparison to pre-Furman
execution rates, see supra note 13.
152. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 6.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 7.
155. Aarons, supra note 144, at 14.
156. Id. at 23. The federal habeas corpus appeals process is incredibly complex.
Therefore, I present only a limited discussion here. For a more thorough analysis of the
details of habeas appeals and their impact on the death penalty process, see id. at 23-46.
157. Id at 23.
158. Id.
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legislation has curtailed many of the delays associated with habeas
corpus appeals by imposing time limits on when the defendant may
file a petition and how quickly the federal courts must issue a
decision. 159

Nevertheless, the "exhaustion doctrine" prohibits a

defendant from filing a habeas corpus appeal until after all state
appeals have concluded. 160

This increases delay because:

(1)

defendants cannot file state and federal appeals concurrently and (2)
whether a defendant has truly "exhausted" his state remedies often

161
becomes a separately litigated issue in federal court.
Given the long length of delays and the relatively small number
of executions that are performed each year, it is easy to see why

empirical research cannot conclusively support the deterrence theory

of the death penalty. A sanction, after all, provides deterrence only
on someone contemplating a crime.162 But once the crime has been
committed, the actual penalty must be imposed to "maintain the
credibility of the deterrent.' 1 63 Only about 300 people out of over
5,000 sentenced have actually been put to death since 1976.164 The
credibility of the death penalty cannot possibly be maintained when
so few persons who are sentenced eventually receive the punishment.

Ironically, one of the economic justifications for capital
punishment-discounting-is actually working against the deterrent
effect of the death penalty. Indeed, in most states, more inmates die
on death row of old age than are executed. 165 This means that to be
executed, a criminal must not only be "a truly nasty person, but also
very, very unlucky."'1 66 When a sanction is imposed "infrequently and
freakishly"'167 it cannot possibly serve as a deterrent because potential
criminals will discount the severity of the punishment by the infinitely
168
small probability of actually being subjected to it.
159. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2263-2266 (2000).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
161. Arlen Specter, A Swifter Death Penalty Would Be an Effective Deterrent, in DOES
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DETER CRIME? 17, 20 (Stephen E. Schonebaum ed., 1998).
Whether all of a habeas petitioner's claims are exhausted is an often litigated issue,
particularly because of the "total exhaustion rule." This rule requires a federal district
court to dismiss all of a petitioner's habeas claims if any of those claims are found to be
unexhausted. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,522 (1982).
162. Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 303.
163. POSNER, supra note 20, at 250.
164. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 25.
165. Id. at 18.
166. Id. at 25.
167. Id.
168. Cf Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 14 n.2 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)
(stating that society's "important interest" in deterrence "is diluted when defendants are
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In addition to reducing the death penalty's deterrent effect
through delays, the complex appellate system surrounding capital
cases exacts huge deadweight losses on society. One conservative
estimate is that a capital case costs an extra one million dollars as
compared to murder cases that are punished with life
imprisonment. 169 The additional cost of death penalty cases may
actually be much higher. In Florida, for example, the cost of death
penalty cases is estimated at $3.2 million per case as compared to
$600,000 for life imprisonment cases. 70 In Texas, death penalty cases
cost $2.3 million compared to $750,000 for cases where the sentence is
forty years imprisonment.' 7 ' California spends approximately $90
million per year on death penalty cases; that averages over $200,000
per death row inmate per year. 172
The true cost of death penalty appeals can be seen when
considering the opportunity costs of state and federal courts. 173 For
example, the Florida Supreme Court spends one-third of its time on
death penalty appeals. 74 Between 1987 and 1994, an average of
28.6% of the California Supreme Court's opinions were death penalty
appeals. 175 The U.S. Supreme Court, even in its limited role in the
death penalty process, also spends a considerable portion of its time
on death penalty appeals. 7 6 All of this time spent on death penalty
appeals represents a social cost in that the courts could have used this
time on other cases.
Following the logical reasoning of the economic approach and its
emphasis on efficiency, if the death penalty only provides a minimal
amount of marginal deterrence over long prison terms, then the
additional social costs of implementing the death penalty are
allowed to escape execution based on factors that have nothing to do with their criminal
responsibility").
169. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 14.
170. Henry P. Curtis, No Plea in FatalCarjacking, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Mar. 13,
1993, at 1.
171. Tony Mauro & Mark Potok, Death Penalty Becoming "Real," USA TODAY, Dec.
7,1994, at 3A.
172. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 13.
173. See Acker et al., supra note 3, at 19.
174. Robert Sherrill, Death Row on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,1983, § 6 (Magazine), at
112.
175. Gerald F. Uelman, The Lucas Court's Seventh Year: Achieving a Balanced Menu,
L.A. DAILY J., June 8,1994 (Res Ipsa Magazine), at 8 tbl. 1.
176. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 438 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("Nearly every week of every year, this Court is presented with at least one petition for
certiorari raising troubling issues of noncompliance with the strictures of Gregg and its
progeny.").
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unjustified and the death penalty as a punishment is inefficient.
Given the empirical research that has been conducted, it is hard (if
not impossible) to argue that the death penalty, as currently
administered, could possibly provide a significant enough marginal
deterrent over life imprisonment without parole to outweigh the
death penalty's exorbitant deadweight losses.
This problem has led several otherwise pro-death-penalty judges
to speak out against the nation's death penalty process. For example,
in 1980, then-Justice Rehnquist filed a rare dissenting opinion against
the denial of certiorari in a death penalty case to express his
frustration:
It seems to me that we have thus reached a stalemate in the
administration of federal constitutional law. Although this Court
has determined that capital punishment statutes do not violate the
Constitution, and although 30-odd States have enacted such
statutes, apparently in the belief that they constitute sound policy,
the existence of the death penalty in this country is virtually an
illusion. Since 1976, hundreds of juries have sentenced hundreds of
persons to death, presumably in the belief that the death penalty in
those circumstances is warranted, yet virtually nothing happens
except endlessly drawn out legal proceedings.... Of the hundreds
of prisoners condemned to die who languish on the various "death
to face any imminent prospect of their
rows," few of them appear
78
sentence being executed.
Likewise, Judge Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has likened the judicial appeals process to a large
snake:
It feeds largely on field mice, an occasional squirrel, maybe a game
hen here and there. Then, one day, it sees a moose, and ravenously
swallows it. For a long time thereafter, it lies immobilized, as the
bulge slowly works its way toward the part of the snake opposite 7its
9
mouth. In this metaphor, our capital cases are a herd of caribou.

IV. Suggestions for Change
The current state of the death penalty in America does not
support the economic approach's theory of deterrence and emphasis
on efficiency. The severe sanction is imposed too infrequently to
serve as an effective deterrent and any marginal deterrence that it
177. See Posner, supra note 17, at 1210.
178. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 957-58 (1980) (Relnquist, J., dissenting from
the Court's denial of certiorari) (citations omitted).
179. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 5.
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does provide cannot outweigh the added costs as compared to the
sanction of life imprisonment without parole. Therefore, from an
economic standpoint, if society wishes to keep the death penalty as an
available sanction, it must overhaul the process so that it may be a
stronger deterrent and impose fewer costs on society.
A. Shorten the Appeals Process in Select Cases

One way to shorten the delay between sentencing and execution
is to reduce the number of appeals available to capital defendants. Of
course, death-penalty opponents and proponents alike are likely to
argue that speeding up the appellate process will lead to a greater
chance of erroneous death penalty convictions. 80 Also, as previously
discussed, any increase in the rate of erroneous death penalty
convictions would work against the deterrent effect of the death
penalty. 181 Therefore, the length of appeals can only be reduced to
the extent that it will not increase the number of erroneous
convictions.
An obvious way to shorten the appeals process without
increasing erroneous convictions would be to repeal the federal
habeas corpus "exhaustion" requirement. 82 This would allow capital
defendants to file their federal appeals concurrently with their state
appeals. Also, the time involved in many habeas appeals would
decrease since exhaustion would no longer be a litigated issue and
federal district courts would only spend time on substantive issues of
83
the habeas appeal.
Another way to shorten the appeals process would be to limit the
defendant to one consolidated and expedited state appeal in cases
where evidence of guilt is overwhelming. This could be achieved
through the increased use of DNA tests to prove or disprove the
identity of the murderer. DNA testing is virtually 100% effective in
4
eliminating someone accused of a crime if performed correctly.18
Indeed, an increasing number of convicted criminals are being
exonerated and freed through the use of DNA. 85 Currently, 82
180. Aarons, supra note 144, at 72.
181. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
183. Specter, supra note 161, at 20.
184. Nancy Ritter, DNA: How Many More Like Cromedy?, N.J. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 10,
2000, at col. 1.
185. See, e.g., Harvey Rice, Justice Deferred, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 26, 2000 (Texas
Magazine), at 6, availableat 2000 WL 24529566 (discussing a man convicted of murder and
sentenced to 99 years in a Texas prison who was released after serving 10 years when two
DNA tests cleared him of guilt); Brooke A. Masters, Missteps on the Road to Injustice,
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inmates have been freed from prison based on DNA evidence, ten of
whom were on death row. 186 Also, forensic gathering of DNA
evidence has advanced; investigators can now retrieve DNA from
dried saliva on a licked postage stamp.187 As DNA testing and
forensics become more advanced, it will undoubtedly clear more
innocent people (or incriminate more guilty people) of crimes.
Of course, DNA has its limitations. DNA evidence can only
make guilt (or innocence) more certain when the identity of the
criminal is an issue at trial. 88 Therefore, if the main issue in a murder
trial is a murderer's state of mind or whether a certain aggravating
factor was present, DNA will not be very useful. Nevertheless, in
those select cases where identity is the main issue and DNA evidence
exists to show the overwhelming guilt of the murderer, lengthy
appeals are unnecessary to further ensure that an innocent man will
89
not be executed.
This suggestion would mean that society would have to invest
greater resources into DNA evidence. DNA testing is not cheap; it
costs between $3,000 and $5,000 per test.190 Only nine states currently
have laws mandating post-conviction DNA testing.' 91 All deathpenalty states would need to pass laws to guarantee DNA testing for
convicted capital defendants. In cases where the defendant is
indigent, the state would have to pay the testing costs as part of its
public defense funding. Only New York currently guarantees such
free DNA testing for indigent defendants.192
The increased costs of mandatory DNA testing would
undoubtedly be recouped by the amount of money saved through
reduced appeals. Furthermore, since studies have shown that most
eyewitness
stem from inaccurate
convictions
erroneous
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2000, at Al (reporting that after 17 years, a man convicted of murder
and sentenced to death in Virginia was freed through DNA testing). Of course, DNA
tests do not always yield a happy result to the defendant. See, e.g., Alan Clendenning,
Bittersweet Justice, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 29, 2000, at 31A, available at 2000 WL
29775851 (reporting that a man wrongfully convicted of rape was cleared through DNA
evidence after serving 20 years in prison, but the DNA evidence incriminated his brother
as a likely suspect).
186. Mark Hansen, The GreatDetective, 87 A.B.A. J., Apr. 2001, at 44.
187. Adam Cohen, Innocent, After Proven Guilty, TIME, Sept. 13, 1999, at 27
(discussing the World Trade Center bombing case, in which DNA was recovered from
saliva on the back of a postage stamp).
188. Id.
189. Cf supra note 142.
190. Cohen, supra note 187, at 28.
191. Hansen, supra note 186, at 39.
192. Cohen, supra note 187, at 28.
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identification, 193 the increased use of the more-accurate DNA tests in
identity cases will yield fewer erroneous convictions. Also, by
expediting cases where DNA evidence has provided an adequate
level of assurance of the defendant's guilt, delays will be reduced in
many cases, increasing the level of potential deterrence.
B.

Reduce the Number of Cases that Qualify for the Death Penalty

While an increased use of DNA evidence may be helpful in
reducing delay in many death penalty cases, several cases do not
hinge on identity of the murderer. Also, the source of delay in death
penalty appeals is not always the defendant.19 4 For example, in
California the greatest cause of delay is the state's inability to secure
enough attorneys to represent indigent capital defendants in their
mandatory state supreme court appeals. 195 California sentences about
three defendants to death per month, but can only find about two
attorneys for. indigent defendants per month.196 This causes some
death row inmates to wait up to four years just to start their state
appeals. 97
For these situations, it seems the only way to improve the death
penalty appeals process is to reduce the supply of capital cases going
through the system. 198 By reducing the number of capital cases, the
appellate process would be better able to handle death penalty
appeals efficiently and timely. To reduce the number of capital cases,
society will need to decide exactly how many capital cases it is able
and willing to process each year. 99 If a given state can (or is willing
to) only execute five convicted criminals per year, then the death
penalty should only be sought in a number of cases that will likely
yield five sentences of death.
This would mean that society would have to seek the death
penalty in only the most heinous cases, which in itself may further the
goal of marginal deterrence. This could be accomplished by the
193. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 57 (1987). This study also showed that in most
erroneous conviction cases, the error was found within five years. Id. at 71. This suggests
that shortening the death penalty process to even half its current length (10 years), see
Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 10, would have little negative impact on the
possibility of executing innocent people.
194. Aarons, supra note 144, at 46, 48.
195. Reed, supra note 148, at Al.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Aarons, supra note 144, at 67; Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 30-31.
199. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 31.
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legislature limiting the list of aggravating factors that qualify for the
death penalty, or simply increasing the number of aggravating factors
required for the death penalty in any given case.2 The other way
society could limit the death penalty to the most heinous crimes is by
relying on the prosecutor's discretion to only seek the death penalty
in the worst cases each year.201 If prosecutors cannot be trusted to use
their charging discretion wisely, prosecutors could be required to
obtain approval from the state attorney general's office before
proceeding with a death penalty charge. This would vest discretion in
on state-wide
a central state authority that could determine, based
2°2
resources, which cases should seek the death penalty.
C. Abolish the Death Penalty
The last solution to the current death penalty problem is to
simply abolish the death penalty altogether. Attempts to create an
efficient and workable death penalty system may be futile. Indeed,
society may decide that the death penalty, even after being
overhauled to reduce the number of appeals, is simply not worth the
effort. From an economic analysis, it may be impossible to create an
efficient system whereby the death penalty is imposed accurately and
still provides enough marginal deterrence to justify its use instead of
life imprisonment without parole.
Nevertheless, society is unlikely to abolish the death penalty in
the near future. Despite its imposition of huge deadweight losses and
its failure to provide an adequate deterrent, the death penalty still
receives the overwhelming support of Americans. 2 3 Furthermore,
abolition would lead to marginal deterrence problems in states that
already impose life imprisonment sentences for murder. In these
states, legislatures would have to change the sentencing structure of
serious crimes to maintain a schedule of sanctions that increase in
severity, culminating with life imprisonment without parole for the
most serious crimes. This may represent a significant undertaking of
200. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
201. Cf. Aarons, supra note 144, at 22-23.
202. Cf.id-

203. Since 1976, Gallup Polls have consistently shown that the vast majority of
Americans support the death penalty. Radelet & Akers, supra note 117, at 1. This
majority reached a high of 80% in 1994. Id While recent polls suggest that the level of
support may be declining, death penalty proponents still maintain a significant majority.
Soskis, supra note 143. In addition to public support, the Supreme Court is unlikely to
impose another Furman-like moratorium in the near future. Since the retirement of
Justice Blackmun, no sitting Justice has expressed a view that capital punishment is
unconstitutional. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 2.
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time and effort on the part of legislators. Hence, these politicians are
unlikely to advocate for abolition if it increases their own workload.
Therefore, on balance, the best solution from the economic
approach to criminal law seems to be to overhaul the death penalty
system to shorten appellate delays by increasing the use of DNA and
decreasing the number of death-penalty-eligible crimes.
Conclusion
The severe sanction of death is theoretically justifiable through
the economic approach's emphasis on deterrence. Nevertheless, the
abysmal way in which America is currently carrying out the death
penalty destroys any deterrent effect and undermines the economic
approach's logic. Where the pendulum had swung too far before
Furman by allowing too high a risk of erroneous and arbitrary
convictions, the pendulum has now swung too far the other way,
wiping out the very justifications for the ultimate criminal sanction.
Therefore, the time is ripe for another evaluation and major overhaul
of the nation's death penalty process. If society cannot devise an
affordable system that provides both a low rate of erroneous
convictions and faster, deterrence-increasing executions, perhaps the
only rational and efficient solution is abolition.

